O PAVOR ARENDTIANO: TRIBUNAIS COM PODER

Autores

  • Thiago Santos Aguiar de Pádua UNICEUB

Palavras-chave:

Hannah Arendt., Suprema Corte Americana., Poder dos Tribunais.

Resumo

Hannah Arendt tinha medo não apenas de um presidente populista falando em nome das pessoas e desapegado da legalidade. Ela também estava preocupada com a possibilidade da vontade popular ser utilizada para apoiar os responsáveis ​​por limitá-la. Mais concretamente, ela estava com medo de a Suprema Corte Americana contar com apoio popular. Este é o significado por trás de sua obscura representação da Suprema Corte como “a verdadeira sede da autoridade na República Americana”, mas inadequada ao poder. Eu argumento que a caracterização arendtiana de autoridade, que não demanda “nem coerção, nem persuasão”, significa que a fonte de legitimidade do Tribunal é a expertise jurídica, e não o apoio público. No entanto, o entendimento atualmente dominante entre os Ministros da Suprema Corte Americana, bem como entre os estudiosos, é o de que o apoio público é a fonte de autoridade do Tribunal. Na mente de Arendt, tal compreensão significa que o Tribunal se tornou a sede do poder. A corrupção da autoridade do Tribunal, e o direito constitucional, enquanto linguagem da especialidade capaz de resistir à opinião pública, inevitavelmente irão acompanhar. Portanto, Arendt estaria extremamente preocupada com a contínua erosão do entendimento do papel da Suprema Corte Americana como jurisperita, e com a ascensão do entendimento de que sua fonte de legitimidade residiria no apoio público.

Biografia do Autor

Thiago Santos Aguiar de Pádua, UNICEUB

Mestre e doutorando em direito no UNICEUB. Professor da Graduação e da Especialização em direito do UNICEUB. Líder do Grupo de Pesquisa “Cortes Constitucionais, democracia e Isomorfismo”. Advogado. Foi assessor de ministro do supremo tribunal Federal. 

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Publicado

2020-11-11

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